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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dave's statement of facts does not comply with this Court's rules regarding factual 
assertions and citation to the record. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(7), 24(e). Instead, it 
consists of a series of conclusions, not evidentiary facts, with little citation to the record. 
Where a citation is provided, it often refers to dozens or even hundreds of pages. Factual 
statements 5, 6, and 8 through 20 contain no citation to the record at all. At page 10, 
when ostensibly summarizing oral testimony of Dave's father concerning his ownership 
claim, the single record citation encompasses 162 pages. The Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically condemned this approach to appellate briefing. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. 
v. Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985) ("[t]he rules of appellate procedure require that 
parties cite to the record when factual assertions are made. . . . It is improper to make 
blanket assertions of fact and leave it to this Court to ferret out evidence from the record 
to support those assertions." (citations omitted)). 
This is not mere procedural sparring. The factual contentions for which no evi-
dentiary support is provided form the backbone of Dave's argument. Particularly in the 
context of Dave's claim that Cathy has failed to appropriately marshal the evidence, 
Dave's reliance on generalizations not tied to any particular evidence at all is inappro-
priate. Not only does it place the burden on the Court to attempt to ascertain what, if any, 
evidence the respondent is referring to, it places the same burden on Cathy's counsel. 
See Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, f 19, 20 P.3d 332 ("[A]ppellate advocates must never 
assume that it is this court's burden to comb the record for evidence supporting poorly 
framed arguments. We have stated this principle on multiple occasions."); Fillmore 
Products, Inc., v. Western States Paving, Inc., 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979) ("We ex-
pect that on appeal, an appellant will facilitate a proper review of the record with appro-
priate references to pages supportive of his assertions, and, where necessary, with ab-
stracts of the trial transcript."). Dave's failure to relate any of his factual statements to 
the record is nothing more than an attempt to disguise an argument as evidence by ob-
scuring its evidentiary sources. Pursuant to longstanding precedent, this Court should 
simply disregard respondent's factual claims that do not have appropriate and specific 
record support. See MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1998) (holding that be-
cause appellee's brief did not comply with court's rules on briefing and citation, it would 
"disregard the issues raised therein pursuant to rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN CONTENDING THAT PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MAR-
SHAL THE EVIDENCE, DAVE MISUNDERSTANDS AND UL-
TIMATELY FAILS TO RESPOND TO CATHY'S CONTENTION 
THAT THE EVIDENCE "CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST" THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION, AND THAT 
THE OUTCOME WAS MANIFESTLY INEQUITABLE. 
A. Dave's Marshaling Claim Fundamentally Misunderstands 
Cathy's Position. 
In focusing his arguments on the testimony of Dave's family members concerning 
their alleged ownership of A-l Rental, Dave fundamentally misunderstands Cathy's posi-
tion. Cathy candidly acknowledged in her brief that the record contains testimony from 
family members supporting Dave's ownership position in this case. 
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Cathy's argument is not that such evidence does not exist or is not significant. Ra-
ther, her argument is that the oral testimony of Dave's family members is insufficient to 
overcome the overwhelming documentary evidence. In other words, applying the appro-
priate standard of review, the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's de-
cision and an inequitable result has been reached. 
Dave's statements to the State of Utah under penalty of perjury must have conse-
quences. Just as in the trial court, Dave's brief contains no attempt whatsoever to explain 
the written record, including those certified regulatory documents. At trial, he contended 
the written record was all erroneous or mistaken. (Tr. pgs. 187-92.) On appeal, he simp-
ly ignores it. 
Nevertheless, the records created for independent business purposes tell a very dif-
ferent story from that told by Dave and his father. The company's annual reports, its in-
ternal accounting records, its banking records, and the handling of its business assets all 
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the testimony of Dave and his father were a conve-
nient artifice to rescue the business from the marital estate. The trial court's property di-
vision should be reversed because the evidence "clearly preponderates against" the trial 
court's findings, and a "serious inequity" has resulted. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 
83, f 17, 45 P.3d 176; Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
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B- The Claim That Cathy Failed to Marshal the Evidence Is 
Without Merit. 
Dave asserts that Cathy has not appropriately marshaled the evidence. His brief 
contains few specifics, and relies entirely on the self-serving oral statements which Cathy 
contends should be disregarded in favor of the written record to the contrary. Where spe-
cifics are mentioned, the Court will find that those specifics were indeed discussed in Ca-
thy's brief. 
At page 9 of his brief, Dave contends that Cathy "totally omitted" evidence that A-
l's tax return indicated that Dave owned 12.5% of A-l Rental. The Court will find this 
evidence discussed in detail at pages 30-31 of Cathy's brief. 
Next, at page 10, Dave asserts that "the extent to which the testimony of Neil 
Child, and numerous other witnesses, has been disregarded [in Cathy's brief] leads one to 
wonder if the person writing Cathy's brief actually participated in, or read the transcript 
of, the actual trial." Dave's brief then proceeds to describe a version of that evidence that 
is not supported by citation to the record and grossly overstates the record. Cathy ac-
knowledged in her brief that Neil Child had testified that he owned the company and al-
lowed Dave to enjoy the economic benefit of the company, even to the detriment of the 
company's value. The Court will find the referenced evidence discussed at pages 15-16 
and 29 of Cathy's brief. Indeed, the failure of Neil Child's testimony to comport with 
economic common sense is an important part of Cathy's argument on appeal. Neil 
Child's actions after 1990 showed no concern for the economic value of the company. 
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I le had no doci 11 iients to suppoi t his conte ntion (rI i f * • - i . • i. i r 
the overwhelming documentary evidence contradicting it (i"r. pg:>. 2454-36). 
Next, at page 11 of his brief, Dave relies on alleged testimony of Dave's brother 
eliminate his income tax obligations, was actually a company bonus system. The com-
pensation system was discussed in detail at pa^es • vl;S .aul 25-27 of Cath\"s ^rief. 
Dave contends that the bonuses allowed him to save up for and n,, ,.; -rx ..uu.;«. esi-
he refers to, however, was offered at trial as an explanation for the claimed reduction of 
Dave's income in 1998 , • ••• - • i\e ^ cumulative toial income was 
$46,800 1- v . . . * . ••-•'• is 
sonal consumption for four years, this is not enough income to have built the home with-
out debt. This is an example of the problem created by the general nature of Dave's 
i • f ii*. * . • v e ::ites 
pages 320-392 of the transcript. None of those pages contains facts supporting his con-
tention. 
• . . • - u . , •- • , j - • • e 
circumstances of the motorhome purchase are discussed at pages 14-15 of Cathy's brief. 
Dave concentrates on, the fact that the motorhome was purchased by A-1 Rental. Cathy 
rboh vrc mini, because the motorhome was undeniably treated as a personal asset of the 
marriage. 
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Dave's only response to the Division of Corporations records is that they are "re-
dacted" (page 14). That is not true. The entire records are in evidence. (Ex. 39.) The 
fact that the Division does not have some of the records (1990 and 1997-2002 are miss-
ing) is meaningless. Until 1989, the forms showed the stated capital of the corporation to 
be $20,000. By the time that question was no longer asked on the form, the company's 
internal accounting records were available. They showed a change in capital structure 
that can only be explained by the redemption of Neil Child's 15,000 shares, at precisely 
the time Dave admits Cathy requested that they purchase Neil's interest; and precisely 
time Cathy recalled, and other evidence showed, the purchase took place. Beginning in 
1991, the Division's records show that the company had only one director, and therefore 
only one owner. This remained the situation until after the divorce was filed in 2003, at 
which time Dave changed the annual reports to comport with his theory that he was not 
the sole owner of the company. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this evidence 
and the other evidence described in Cathy's opening brief: The parties purchased Neil 
Child's interest in the company to satisfy Cathy's concern that if the family was to sacri-
fice to build the business, it should have the economic benefit of that sacrifice. 
While the trial court enjoys "considerable discretion" in dividing property in di-
vorce cases, that discretion must be exercised within certain limits. Thus, a property di-
vision should be reversed if the evidence "clearly preponderates against" the trial court's 
findings, or when a "serious inequity" has resulted. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 
f 17, 45 P.3d 176; Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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CRISIS ;;.n a case. The self-serving caKcu •_: ... . •....- .; , .... ...s 
f -iU:'' - < •. v ! " ^ i*r the company wa s -% f!r'v ^consistent Willi mi iccuid^, with prior 
statements under oath, and. with their conduct, that the trial court erred in accepting it. 
C. 1lie Company Should Be Included In ,,.«. Maru\,t L.*hnc On 
the Basis of Exceptional Circumstance-
Dave fails to respond to Cathy's arguments that the company should have been 
treated as a marital asset on the basis of exceptional circumstances; and that Dave's en-
property division, xke uial court ignored these claims. As noted in Cathy's opening 
brier, an equal division of marital property is not necessarily an equitable one. especially 
divorce financial positions of the parties. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 ^utaii 1987); 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304. 308 (Utah 1988). Such is the case here. 
D. The leuu Loan Jirrea in \aiiiing *\-i ixeniai .u a tigure 
Dave's argument regarding the valuation of A-l Rental also fails to respond to Ca-
thy's position on appeal. The trial couu ., IKU iiVv.- ;;;• .•an .aluations out . . . . . . . 
uations * - ;\- m c hisi ••-» "^ -*\ • : -md ^ nrnronriately ex-
plained in the findings. In this case, the trial court's valuation satisfies neither require-
ment. The explanations advanced . ^ N >nei arc a at ea without any reference to the 
: - vivu;i \t. . * v- . • . rden 
on Cathy's counsel, and the Court, to sift tlirough over 3,000 pages of trial transcript to 
locate what he is talking about. I Indersigned counsel does not believe the statements 
made in Dave's brief have record support. Without appropriate record citation, it is im-
possible to respond to Dave's argument other than to say that, even if taken at face value, 
it does not lead to any valuation number in evidence upon which the trial court could 
have relied in reaching its valuation. See Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[w]e will not consider conclusory arguments without citation to 
either the record or cases involving pivotal issues."). The trial court's valuation should be 
reversed because that court's decision is not consistent with the evidence and its metho-
dology is not explained in its findings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 32' BAY-
LINER BOAT TO DAVE'S BROTHER, AND IN TREATING 
THE 2002 CORVETTE AS A "GIFT". 
Dave's argument regarding the 32' Bayliner boat repeats his claim that the evi-
dence has not been marshaled. Cathy's brief, however, readily acknowledged that there 
was evidence in the record that the boat was claimed by Blue Water Marine. Cathy's po-
sition is that the evidence that Blue Water Marine held a manufacturer's statement of ori-
gin for the boat was inadequate to overcome compelling evidence that it was a marital as-
set. At the time of trial, the 32-foot Bayliner boat was located in the garage of the par-
ties' personal residence. Cathy testified that they traded their Winnebago motorhome, 
along with cash, to Brad Child for the boat. (Tr. pgs. 945-48.) Dave never adequately 
reconciled his claim that Blue Water Marine owned the boat with his various attempts to 
explain the disappearance of the Winnebago from the marital estate. (Tr. pgs. 459-61, 
451.) At the time of the purchase of the boat, Cathy removed the parties' personal be-
longings from the motorhome and put them in the boat (Tr. pgs. 945-48), and all use of 
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the boat was personal. Cathy testified that they always used dealer stickers when they 
took boats out. (Tr. pgs. 938-39.) Brad Child testified that keeping boats nominally in 
the inventory of the business facilitated evasion of tax and registration fees. (Tr. pgs. 
2526-27.) Dave admitted that they owned other boats that were not registered, including 
the 1992 boat. The evidence "clearly preponderates against" the trial court's exclusion of 
the boat from the marital estate, and a "serious inequity" has resulted. Elman v. Elrnan, 
2002 UT App 83 f 17, 45 P.3d 176; Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Dave concedes in his brief that the 2002 Corvette was a marital asset. Thus, any 
funds paid toward the loan on the car after trial should be deemed to have come from 
joint funds, and any remaining debt should also be deemed joint. Given the passage of 
time, it is unclear from the record whether there is remaining debt on the car. Certainly, 
i 
if Dave's request that the car be awarded to Cathy is to be followed, there must be an ap-
propriate adjustment to alimony to enable her to pay any remaining installment payments. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
WHICH WAS LESS THAN PETITIONER'S NEED AND LESS 
THAN RESPONDENT'S ABILITY TO PAY. 
Dave fails to respond to Cathy's argument concerning the amount of the alimony 
award, except to claim in his cross-appeal that Cathy's income was overstated. The evi-
dence was that at the time of trial Cathy was attending school to obtain an accounting de-
gree. (Tr. pgs. 845-46.) Thus, Dave's contention that her income was simply an arith-
metic computation is not consistent with the evidence. The trial court's calculation was 
well within the evidence presented at trial and no basis exists to reverse the calculation. 
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More importantly, the trial court failed to make an equitable alimony award be-
cause the award failed to satisfy Cathy's need when there were adequate funds to do so. 
Dave does not answer this argument in this brief.1 The findings do not support the ali-
mony award, and that award must be reversed. 
IV. EVEN IF THE COMPANY HAD BEEN SEPARATE PROPERTY, 
IT HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY MARITAL FUNDS AND EF-
FORTS TO THE POINT THAT IT HAS LOST ITS SEPARATE 
CHARACTER. 
In his cross-appeal, Dave argues, without a single citation to the record, that his al-
leged 12.5 percent interest in A-1 Rental should have been excluded from the marital es-
tate because he owned it prior to the marriage. Dave has the burden of proof on this 
claim. This claim must be measured against undisputed evidence that, at the time of the 
marriage, this interest was essentially worthless; and against the trial court's rejection, on 
the basis of all of the evidence, of the claim that Brad Child owned 12.5 percent of the 
company. 
1
 At several points in his brief, Dave espouses the entirely discredited claim that his post-
alimony income was $800 per month. The trial court rejected this on the basis of over-
whelming evidence (e.g., Ex. 92), and Dave makes no serious effort to dispute it, except 
to make the naked claim that his income is really $800. In reality, the trial court found 
that his income was $11,530 per month. (R. 836.) In addition he had, and continues to 
have, access to and full control of the entire economic value of A-1 Rental, which during 
the marriage substantially enhanced the parties' standard of living and continues to en-
hance Dave's standard of living post-divorce. 
2
 Even if the Court were to accept a separate property claim with regard to the 12.5 per-
cent, it would not cause the rest of the company to qualify as separate property. Cathy's 
evidence is that the remaining interest in the company was acquired during the marriage 
in a buyout, using marital funds. Accordingly, this issue is limited to the 12.5 percent in-
terest Dave claims in the company. 
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Dave's testimony is that the 12.5 percent interest in the company was worth 
$2,500 at the time of the marriage, as that is what he claims he sold the same amount of 
shares to his brother for. (R. 63, 2489). At the time of trial, 12.5 percent of the company 
was worth $176,750 according to Mr. Townsend's valuation. (Tr. pg. 1132; Ex. 94). 
That exceptional increase in value was made possible by the investment of marital time, 
talents, and monies, all of which converts the interest to marital property under Utah law. 
The use of marital funds and efforts to maintain and augment an asset supports a finding 
that the appreciation of separate property is marital in character. See Schaumberg v. 
Schaurnberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that property acquired by one spouse either by gift or inheritance becomes a 
part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense con-
tributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquir-
ing an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse." 760 P.2d at 308. 
In this case, not only have commingled marital funds been used to maintain A-1 
Rental, and not only did Cathy provide personal services to A-1 Rental for many years, 
but Dave's ability to invest time and effort into A-1 Rental during the marriage came at 
the expense of time devoted to his family, and was made possible by Cathy's agreement 
to support the family in the late 1980s and early 1990s while Dave built the company. 
Her financial contribution is evidenced by Exhibits 37 and 38, which show Dave's extra-
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ordinarily low income during that period ($9,600 per year in 1990 and 1991) while Cathy 
supported the family. It was also made possible by Cathy's domestic contributions in 
managing household affairs and caring for the parties' children. (R. 844-48.) 
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the court held 
that a portion of the husband's business property, which was initially paid for by funds 
the husband inherited, was properly included as a marital asset. The court explained that 
"[e]ven though the husband used inherited funds to pay the down payment on the build-
ing, he used substantial marital funds to maintain and augment that asset. We find no er-
ror in the determination that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character 
from a personal asset to a marital asset." 875 P.2d at 602-03. 
Utah law in the area of separate property focuses on direct financial contribution. 
E.g., Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 602-03. There is no Utah case that considers the impor-
tant question of "sweat equity" in otherwise separate property. Nevertheless, the only 
marital asset of two parties at the inception of a marriage is their time and talents. Those 
assets can be directed toward accumulation of joint property or toward enhancement or 
maintenance of separate property. In either instance, however, the effort so invested is 
presumed to belong to the marital estate. See Mortensen. In this case, Dave's time and 
talents were invested growing A-l Rental from a $20,000 company in 1987 to a $1.4 mil-
lion company at the time of trial. Cathy also worked for the company without compensa-
tion. (R. 848-51.) No other alleged shareholders contributed any money or effort to that 
growth. The Court should recognize not only the parties' joint financial contribution to 
the company, but their "sweat equity" as well. 
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The lack of a clearly defined boundary between A-l Rental and the family is 
another compelling reason the trial court correctly considered Dave's entire interest in A-
1 Rental to be a marital asset. Money flowed freely between A-l Rental and the family 
during the entire course of the marriage. There is substantial evidence that a significant 
portion of the lifestyle of the parties was provided by leaving assets, such as the Holiday 
Rambler motorhome and the items described on page 5 of Cathy's opening brief, in the 
business for tax purposes even though they were purchased for personal use. There is al-
so substantial evidence of the payment of family expenses through the business in order 
to write them off on the company's tax returns. These practices are further indicia that, 
from the standpoint of the family, the company was nothing more than the alter ego of 
Dave. 
Finally, any premarital interest in A-l Rental was correctly included in the marital 
estate because Dave's ability to dedicate time and effort in developing the business was a 
direct result of Cathy's domestic contributions to the family. In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the court held that it was error not to include in the marital 
estate the husband's professional corporation and royalty rights on surgical instruments 
developed during the marriage. The court emphasized that although the wife "was not 
his partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the 'business' of 
marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth of his practice and 
the business." 802 P.2d at 1318. 
Like the wife in Dunn, Cathy's efforts here in maintaining the household and car-
ing for the children enabled Dave to pursue with vigor his business enterprises, and he 
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did so at the expense of his family. As described in Dunn, all of A-l Rental should be in-
cluded in the marital estate because Dave and Cathy were partners in the "business of 
marriage." The evidence plainly satisfies the Mortensen tests of commingling and joint 
contribution to the enhancement of the asset, and Dave's evidence fails to rebut the 
strong presumption that in such circumstances the property should be included in the ma-
rital estate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Cathy requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
conclusion that A-l Rental was not a marital asset, and remand the property division to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with that conclusion. Similarly, Cathy 
requests that this Court reverse the alimony and attorney's fees decisions of the district 
court and remand those issues to the trial court for further consideration applying appro-
priate legal standards. 
DATED this J^2day of June, 2008. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
C \NRPORTBL\IDOCS\RRP\883273_l DOC 6/16/08 
-14-
( MINI K \ II' <lh Si U\ l< E 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT were served by U.S. Mail on June 16, 2008 as follows: 
JOANEPAPPAS 
10 W MAIN ST 
PRICE UT 84501-3134 
CONNIE MOWER 
PO BOX 1270 
CASTLE DAI U HI XLS I « 12/0 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
-15-
